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For Hecuba or for Hamlet: Rethinking Emotion and Empathy 
in the Theatre
Amy Cook
It is true that I am a proselytizer for the work being done at the intersection 
of the cognitive sciences and the humanities; I can be found on college campuses 
shaking a copy of The Way We Think (2002) or How the Body Shapes the Mind 
(2006) and spreading the good word about the importance of deploying research 
from across the cognitive sciences to previously held beliefs about language and 
bodies onstage. My aims are not small and my opinions are not meek. There are 
questions about the great impact that language and performance has on an audience 
to which I still do not have the answer and yet find more exciting given research 
in the cognitive sciences. This essay, however, will not be a manifesto, nor will it 
present clear answers or bold claims. Working in an intersection requires a degree 
of caution. 
I know better than to let that metaphor go unquestioned: interdisciplinary 
inquiry need not be work and it need not be perilous. If, instead, I describe my project 
here as playing on the beachfront of theatre and performance studies, watching how 
the waves of research from the cognitive sciences come in and alter the shoreline, 
I may open up the field of play, rather than advancing an argument for a kind of 
work. This is not to suggest that the scholarship is lazy and noncommittal, rather 
that what I seek to do here is imagine the kinds of sandcastles that could be made 
on this beach here and now. What if, for example, research on emotions could show 
us how to rethink our moat building? What if the science of empathy changed how 
we understood the properties of sand? Research on emotions and empathy, the stock 
and trade of theatre, poses exciting new questions for the theory and practice of 
theatre and will shape, dissolve, and reconstitute how we understand what is staged. 
The Player blows Hamlet’s mind because he can cry and feel emotions for 
someone he doesn’t know as someone he isn’t: 
O what a rogue and peasant slave am I! 
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Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit
That, from her working, all his visage wann’d,
Tears in his eyes, distraction in’s aspect,
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing! 
For Hecuba!
What’s Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba,
That he should weep for her?1
Who are we if our bodies, minds, and emotions can change, Proteus-like, so 
easily? For Hecuba. Further, who is it that is feeling and for whom? Hamlet’s 
almost chiasmatic formulation (“What’s Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba”) creates 
this relational loop—Hecuba to Player and back again—that seems to Hamlet 
to contain no source for emotion. But the spectator of Shakespeare’s play—and 
Hamlet himself—is struck by the performance of emotion in Hamlet. Hamlet 
keeps commenting on the seeming of others, with the Player just being the most 
professional, drawing the spectator’s attention to the complicated performance of 
emotion by Hamlet in Hamlet. The plot, in fact, depends on an understanding of 
the emotion that does and does not cause action and delay in the play. There is a 
triangular relationship that is always in effect in performance: the character, the 
actor, and the spectator. Who is feeling for whom? It is clear to Hamlet that the 
Player is feeling something in the place of his character for another character and 
it is clear to us that Hamlet is feeling something for the Player. Just as Hamlet asks 
about the Player, though, I want to ask how the actor playing Hamlet can feel for 
Hamlet? What’s Hamlet to him or he to Hamlet that he should weep for him? But 
then, what about me? Why am I moved watching actors feeling for characters feeling 
for characters in a play I know so well I am mouthing the words? To understand 
the play is to feel the emotions it evokes—there is no thinking without feeling. 
But this suggests that emotions are objects, things the playwright places onstage 
for us to reach out and feel the way we might feel the costume fabric, if the actor 
got close enough. Before he can understand the connection between the Player and 
Hecuba—the connection that allows for the transfer of emotion—Hamlet needs to 
stabilize just what emotion is. If emotion isn’t what we think it is, then “transfer” 
is the wrong word; if emotion isn’t an object but is rather a process or a verb, then 
empathy—the Player’s feeling for Hecuba, Hamlet’s feeling for the Player, our 
feeling for Hamlet—needs rethinking too. 
Hamlet’s concern that the Player weeps for Hecuba while he, with “the motive 
and the cue for passion,” does nothing suggests an interesting relationship between 
emotions and fiction. Hamlet sees his own reality as more likely to prompt real 
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feelings (and, he assumes, actions) and he is outraged that he is not drowning 
the stage with tears. As Hamlet rages about being dull and “unpregnant of my 
cause,” Shakespeare crams the speech with extra syllables and interrupted lines, 
contradicting Hamlet’s claim that he is “muddy-mettled” and says “nothing”:
Who calls me villain, breaks my pate across, 
Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face,
Tweaks me by the nose, gives me the lie i’ th’ throat
As deep as to the lungs—who does me this?2
The first three lines above begin with a spondaic and then trochaic feet, shifting the 
usual rhythm of the iambic foot which stresses the second syllable to a rhythm that 
stresses the first syllable. The heartbeat rhythm of iambic pentameter calms and 
regulates the speaker and listener and, thus, irregularity signals emotional content 
in and of itself. The third line interrupts the iambic rhythm further, shoving extra, 
unstressed syllables into the line with a trochee in the first, third, and fourth foot. 
Our ear, trained to hear five stressed syllables per line, must integrate additional 
information and the actor’s speech must speed up to cram the added information 
in without thoroughly disrupting the music of the language. Hamlet’s soliloquy 
expresses and exposes his own emotions—he has more than the cue for passion 
here. Moreover, finding himself moved by the Player’s performance of emotions, 
he transforms the “nothing” of his response into a plan. The fiction of the theatre, 
he decides, is the way to capture the truth of the king’s guilt. Emotion, like the 
“direction” best discovered through “indirection,” is best assayed through the 
performance of emotion.3 
The performance of emotion is not necessarily the same thing as emotion. The 
Player performs emotions in reaction to a story of a woman’s emotional reaction to 
her husband’s death; while he clearly shows the biological effluvia of emotions—he 
cries, turns pale, etc.—we do not know whether he experiences the emotions he 
expresses. Similarly, while Shakespeare expresses Hamlet’s emotions in verse and 
the actor performs Hamlet’s emotions in performance, the audience of Hamlet does 
not know whether or not the actor playing Hamlet actually feels the emotions he 
conveys. As Denis Diderot says in The Paradox of Acting, and as neuroscientists 
have shown, the performance need not accurately index the stimulus:
[B]ut what of these touching and sorrowful accents that are 
drawn from the very depth of a mother’s heart and that shake 
her whole being? Are these not the result of true feeling? Are 
these not the very inspiration of despair? Most certainly not. The 
proof is that they are all planned; that they are part of a system 
of declamation; . . . that, to hit the right mark once, they have 
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been practised a hundred times. . . . At the very moment when 
he touches your heart he is listening to his own voice; his talent 
depends not, as you think, upon feeling, that you fall into the 
trap. . . . All these emotions he has given to you. The actor is 
tired, you are unhappy; he has had exertion without feeling, you 
feeling without exertion.4 
Konstantin Stanislavski, via his nom de maitre Tortsov, explains that it is only 
through accessing the actor’s own emotions that he or she can portray the emotions 
of the character: “The actor carefully transfers his best qualities onto the stage. The 
form and setting will vary according to the play, but the actor’s human emotions, 
which run parallel to the feelings of the role, must remain alive. They must not 
be faked, or replaced by something else, some convoluted actor’s trick.”5 Such 
tricks stain the believability of the actor’s performance for Stanislavski. When an 
actor cries onstage, an audience may or may not notice the seeming virtuosity of 
the actor capable of crying for the emotions of his character (however he or she 
manages to do it). Certain biological responses—crying, for example—might call 
our attention to the body of the actor less than others—an erection, for example. 
As with Duse’s famous blush, blood flow is not expected to be under our conscious 
control and, therefore, is outside the actor’s toolbox. If it cannot be accessed at 
will, then presumably the actor must experience the necessary emotion in order to 
evoke the concomitant biological response. This is the basis of inside-out systems 
of acting: match the inside feeling of the character and the outside of the actor will 
express the character. But, as Joseph Roach has shown, the science of acting changes 
to reflect contemporary scientific thinking, so perhaps it is time to interrogate our 
ideas of emotion in light of current scientific thinking about emotion.6 
Rhonda Blair has initiated this intellectual and practical project. In her book 
The Actor, Image, and Action (2008), Blair does not assault twentieth-century 
acting theory—based primarily on Stanislavski—but neither does she borrow 
science to “prove” that the creative forces in theatre “had it right.” The research 
of one discipline and methodology is applied to the work of the actor to enrich and 
enhance what the actor knows and does:
Since acting grows out of our biological being, what we are 
learning about memory and imagination, and the way emotion, 
reason, and physicality are ultimately inseparable in the brain’s 
structure and function, has significant implications for how we 
understand what happens when we act.7
Cognitive science allows Blair to rethink acting terms, putting pressure on 
assumptions and methods that do not cohere with current research and adjusting 
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the vocabulary or strategies to take advantage of what we know about how we 
remember, how we feel, and how we imagine. Although the science of emotion 
has yielded exciting and important work in the last twenty-five years, there is no 
universal agreement about how exactly it works or even what it is.
In Descartes’ Error (1994), Antonio Damasio defines emotions as a “collection 
of changes in body state that are induced in myriad organs by nerve cell terminals, 
under the control of a dedicated brain system, which is responding to the content of 
thoughts relative to a particular entity or event.”8 Sensory input is sent directly to the 
thalamus, which is responsible for shunting any potentially alarming information 
to the amygdala, the body’s alarm mechanism. This “down and dirty” pathway of 
emotion—through the superior colliculus and pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus—
suggests that stimulus can be reacted to without being “seen” by the visual system 
or assessed by the cerebral cortex.9 Once the sensory cortex has assessed the 
stimulus, it will send inhibitory or excitatory information to the hypothalamus, 
which is responsible for sending and receiving messages to and from the rest of 
the body. The messages involve neurotransmitters and hormones to alter the body 
state in reaction to the stimulus. These changes or emotional symptoms include 
sweaty palms, dry mouth, a heart rate change, flushing or pallor, constriction of 
the stomach, and relaxation or tension of muscles. These responses occur in order 
to protect as, for example, a change in heart rate will be necessary if the organism 
needs to flee from the stimulus evoking this response. The hypothalamus monitors 
the effect of the physical changes on the body and communicates this to the cortex, 
which continues to assess the information and excite or inhibit the body’s reaction 
via the hypothalamus.
A racing heart, however, could mean panic, rage, or love. Although there may 
be subtle differences between panic and love in the overall chemical changes in 
the body, Damasio argues that the primary difference lies in the assessment of the 
body state by the cerebral cortex. The assessment, which he calls the feeling, is 
defined as the experience of the emotion in the body juxtaposed to our images, 
memories, and knowledge of the experience and the stimuli that initiated it. The 
physical reaction of the body is not specific to a feeling; for the feeling to register 
to the person the specific mix of bodily changes must be assessed in light of other 
information. The racing heart and constricted stomach is assessed as love because of 
the candlelight and the dilated eyes of the man across the table. In another situation, 
the same experience feels like food poisoning. Whereas emotions can generally be 
perceived by a bystander, Damasio avers, feelings are internal and private mental 
states evoked by the physical reaction of emotions. 
We may experience emotions as something that happens to us—we are 
overcome with joy, blinded by rage, etc.—but that does not mean it is this way. Lisa 
Feldman Barrett points out that there has been no empirical evidence that emotion 
is something that exists somewhere. She argues against Damasio, Joseph LeDoux 
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and others who argue that “kinds of emotion have specific neural essences” and 
points out that various studies have failed to find neural correlates for the major 
emotions.10 There may be studies wherein subjects articulate emotions, core and 
otherwise, but that may just be categorization. Though our experience of emotion 
may match the Galenic model of humors coursing through the body, altering our 
perceptions, actions, moods, and so forth, “[c]areful study has determined that 
we rarely experience things as they actually are. Perception is constructive, even 
at the most basic sensory levels.”11 This is not to say that individual stimulus is 
constructed, but that the meaning of the stimulus—in relation with a reading of its 
context—is always a creative act by the perceiver.
Emotions, for Barrett, are not entities that cause an experience of emotion; 
they are perceptions of our “core affect” defined by Barrett as “the ongoing 
neurophysiological state that results from evaluations of the (internal and external) 
environment.”12 Although core affect is present at all times, a particular read of the 
core affect can give rise to an experience of a discreet emotional episode:
Although emotion is experienced as a discrete act, core affect is 
in constant flow and flux. People are continuously in some state 
of core affect, constantly moving their faces and their bodies. The 
possibility pursued here is that the ebb and flow of core affect 
is parsed into discrete events during the process of perception, 
and it becomes perceptually bound to the object that is believe 
[sic] to have caused the feeling in the first place. As a result, a 
person becomes angry with someone, afraid of something, sad 
about something.13
The core affect, then, is a dynamic yet ever-present state that we experience as 
emotion in the act of assessing it. If emotion is a verb—the assessing, not the 
assessed—then we should rethink what an actor does when he/she feels something 
onstage. Of course, Hamlet’s confusion about the relationship between the emotion 
he is perceiving in the actor and the stated cause of the emotion does not make sense 
given most twentieth-century acting theory: the Player may be crying while talking 
about Hecuba, but it doesn’t mean he is thinking about or feeling for Hecuba. And 
yet, the assumption made by many Method actors to follow Stanislavski via Lee 
Strasberg is that the emotion is incited by the story; imagine Aunt Polly and talk 
of Hecuba. To imagine a core affect that is present always already and emotion 
as the act of assessing it is to open the possibility that we are overcomplicating 
emotion onstage. If—instead of being an object that hurls itself from a person or 
environment onto our amygdala, is experienced with backstory and future story in 
the brain, and then elicits an outward show—emotion is actually a storyless jelly 
that affords and shapes our actions, then an emotion onstage will be something you 
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do, like a dance, rather than something you have, like a prop.
While Barrett’s explanation sees emotions as individual perceptions of internal 
states, for others, emotions are primarily social. Paul Griffiths and Andrea Scarantino 
see emotions as socially situated interpersonal strategies that are always engaged 
in relationship with or “scaffolded” by the environment.14 One’s emotions here 
are always in such a tight feedback loop with the environment that it is not always 
clear which is which. Emotions, for Griffiths and Scarantino, are dynamic scenes:
In traditional models of emotional appraisal, the organism 
receives information from the environment and uses it to 
determine the emotional significance of the situation that 
confronts it. In contrast, the situated perspective envisages 
organisms ‘probing’ their environment through initial emotional 
responses, and monitoring the responses of other organisms to 
determine how the emotion will evolve.15
This give and take of emotion understands the individual as always situated within 
a dynamic system; emotions here are communicative and socially performed: 
“For society to function smoothly, individuals must have the right emotions at 
the right times, and it is not left to individual psychological processes to ensure 
that this occurs.”16 We have wedding ceremonies, funerals, and performances of 
Hamlet because we need practice to learn how to navigate the emotional reactions 
required of us.  
The socially situated perspective on emotion is similar to theories of emotional 
contagion. Elaine Hatfield, John Cacioppo, and Richard Rapson see emotions 
relationally, in that they can be caught and spread and are determined by stimulus 
from the outside or the inside. In Emotional Contagion, they argue that “an important 
consequence of emotional contagion is an attentional, emotional, and behavioral 
synchrony that has the same adaptive utility (and drawbacks) for social entities 
(dyads, groups) as has emotion for the individual.”17 What this suggests is that we 
are not separate and contained individuals; we are porous and seeping. According 
to emotional contagion theory, we “synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, 
postures, and movements with those of another person and, consequently . . . 
converge emotionally.”18 Based on the speed with which their studies show that this 
occurs, this is not a conscious attempt to reflect or match the feelings of another 
but rather an automatic mirroring. Here, emotions are a series of relational signals 
between and within bodies, since to experience and understand an emotion (of self or 
other) requires embodied imitation. Although their work in this area has continued, 
this book was written in 1994, two years before mirror neurons were discovered in 
monkeys. Research since then has shown that humans as well as monkeys have a 
neural mirroring system that may facilitate shared emotional states. This automatic 
78                                                               Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
embodied imitation (at least as far as some small number of cells is concerned) 
suggests that our knowledge of the experience and intentions of others comes to 
us immediately, that a motivation for collaboration comes from deep in our cells, 
and social emotional synchrony or understanding is a bottom-up as well as a top-
down process. The science of emotion, however, continues to grow and change. 
Perhaps the most important thing to note for theatre scholars is the metaphor used 
to understand emotions. Are they things that can be “caught”? Particular body 
states? Perturbations in a dynamic social system? How we imagine the subject, 
of course, defines how we can imagine new ways of studying it. One thing that is 
clear—though it must continually be restated—is: emotion is a fundamental and 
instantaneous part of any and all cognitive assessment and interpretation. Again, 
there is no interpretation of an event, text, or image that does not involve emotion, 
sensation, and memory. Understanding emotions, then, is not just important in 
trying to figure out how to convey them to an audience, it is important because it 
is part of how we know what we know.
Empathy
First articulated in the nineteenth century as a way of understanding how 
particular paintings and sculptures can impel feeling—how we “feel into” a 
Romantic landscape painting, for example, or characters in a Victorian novel—
empathy has become an investigative focus in cognitive science, psychology, 
philosophy, ethics, and narratology, as well as aesthetics.19 Some define empathy as 
sharing the affective state of another, others insist it includes perspective-taking—
understanding the affective state from the other person’s point of view—and some 
add that it includes a desire to do something with or for the other person. Daniel 
C. Batson outlines eight different concepts that have all been labeled “empathy,” 
distinguishing, for example, “Imagining How Another is Thinking and Feeling” 
(Concept 5) from “Imagining How One Would Think and Feel in the Other’s 
Place” (Concept 6).20 When fMRI machines register firings in particular parts of 
the brain of subjects seeing a knife fall toward someone’s foot, it is called empathy. 
When a character onstage cries because of an experience of his character, or the 
audience cries watching this performance, we call it empathy. When we go to the 
Holocaust Museum and feel moved at the artifacts of genocide, we call it empathy. 
Because Judge Sonia Sotomayor has had “experience being tested by obstacles 
and barriers, by hardship and misfortune” she will bring empathy to the Supreme 
Court.21 If empathy is something I can feel for a character, experience neurally and 
preconsciously, and adjust for social, judicial, ethical, and historical contexts, it 
qualifies as a vexed term.22 Theatre scholars should attend to the interdisciplinary 
scrum over empathy because social emotional contagion is  our stock and trade. 
In her contribution to David Román’s collection of essays by theatre and 
performance scholars on “tragedy” in the immediate aftermath of September 11, Jill 
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Dolan reports empathizing “so deeply” with the passenger on the plane or the World 
Trade Center office worker who clutched her purse to her chest as she jumped out of 
the burning tower, that “after the first several days of obsessive viewing, listening, 
and reading, I weaned myself away, immersed myself in the remains of the rest of 
my life, just so that I . . . could protect myself for a future I now question exists.” 
She then asks, “Has performance trained me for such painful empathy?”23 This is 
an excellent question—certainly one that would, if answered in the affirmative, 
justify a tremendous amount of federal support of the arts—and one that requires 
some clarification around what we want and need “empathy” to mean and what 
we are pointing to when we speak of a performance that could elicit the kind of 
reaction Dolan (and many others) had watching the bodies fall. 
Empathy is often thought of in terms of that 90s cliché: “I feel your pain.” 
And, indeed, research on nociception has produced the clearest indication that we 
do feel one another’s pain. Lying in an fMRI machine, a subject is shown a video 
of a person cutting a carrot and then accidentally cutting her own finger. Images 
of the brain at that moment, the moment the knife strikes the finger, show cells 
firing in the region of the brain that registers pain. Pain perception involves some 
of the neurons responsible for registering pain felt by the self and, thus, knowing 
the other person is in pain means, on some level, feeling the pain they are in. 
(Again, cognition and interpretation is a full-bodied affair.) This is extraordinary 
information for people interested in performance and spectatorship. Without going 
more in depth into pain perception research or some of the qualifications,24 if all 
I allow in right now is the idea that the perception of pain is also the experience 
of pain, I must acknowledge that the body and the emotions are inseparable from 
cognition and that the subject and object might not be where I begin but rather 
where I end. Before there is you or me, the knife and the carrot, there is the pain.
Although studies have revealed partial overlap in cell excitation in seeing pain 
and experiencing pain, there is not a complete mirroring and an appraisal of the 
context (“my thumb is not actually in danger”) quickly inhibits further cell firing. 
Even though I may feel your pain, I do not forget that I am me and you are you. 
The recognition that the aversive act is not happening to the self, but to the other, 
is what makes it “empathy” and not “pain.” The “painful empathy” that Dolan 
experienced is not conducive to empathetic acts: if it hurts to be aware of it, we 
turn away from the aversive stimulus, conflating the stimulus hurting them with 
the stimulus hurting us. Pivotal to empathy, then, is not a merging of self and other 
but the recognition of separation. As Decety and Lamm point out, 
Self-awareness is a necessary condition for making inference 
about the mental states in others. Therefore, ‘agency’ is a 
crucial aspect for successfully navigating shared representations 
between self and other. Further, agency plays a pivotal role in 
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cognitive development, including the first stage of self-awareness 
. . . . Indeed, the ability to recognize oneself as the agent of a 
behavior is the way one builds an entity independent from the 
external world. In the case of empathy, affective sharing must be 
modulated and monitored by the sense of whose feelings belong 
to whom, and thus, agency is a crucial aspect that enables a 
selfless regard for the other rather than a selfish desire to escape 
aversive arousal.25
If you are really in pain, you do not want me to feel your pain. You want me to feel 
my own power to stop your pain. 
Pain is subject/object neutral; empathy is a relationship. While empathy may 
begin with an experience of shared pain, it does not end there. Empathy requires a 
distinction between self and other and also the ability to take on the perspective of 
the other in order to assess the causes and circumstances of the pain. As Frederique 
de Vignemont and Tania Singer argue, a definition of empathy should include 
a number of qualifications: shared affect, an awareness of the other person’s 
perspective, and the knowledge that the other person is the cause of one’s affective 
state. This is why emotional contagion, for them, is not empathy, because a baby 
can cry when it hears another baby cry but not know that the other is the source of 
his upset. To have empathy is to understand the story of the pain. 
Pain always has a story. The experience of pain may destroy language, context, 
and the world, as Elaine Scarry has argued,26 but the perception of that experience 
requires a remaking of the world capable of creating that pain. All pain is not created 
equal. In one study, subjects played a series of games with confederates, some 
of whom played fairly and some of whom did not. When the male subjects then 
witnessed the unfair players being pricked with a pin, their brains showed an absence 
of empathic activity and actually showed activity in areas associated with pleasure.27 
A study by Lamm et al. included subjects’ assessments of the pain level of the other. 
They found that the subjects who were asked to imagine themselves going through 
the painful experience they were watching the other undergo perceived the pain 
to be greater than those asked to imagine that it was another in pain. Additionally, 
subjects who were told that the person was undergoing successful treatment for 
a health problem perceived the pain to be less than those told the treatment was 
unsuccessful. The scientists conclude, “[B]oth bottom-up (automatic) and top-down 
(controlled) processes interact to produce the experience of empathy. Knowledge 
about the context in which the pain experience occurs provides important clues to 
the role of top-down cognitive appraisal in the regulation of the vicarious affective 
pain reaction.”28 Empathy means that we feel it, we see it, and we contextualize it. 
And usually we care about it. Empathy is not a value-neutral term: we assume 
that to have empathy for another person is a good thing, and that if someone feels 
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the pain of the other person he or she will also want to alleviate that pain. But if 
a person witnesses another person in pain and does not want to alleviate it, does 
he or she not have empathy? Research on psychopaths suggests that they lack the 
kind of mirroring found in others when witnessing another in pain. In fact, they 
do not feel anything particularly deeply and yet they can be incredibly good at 
faking the emotions their social environments expect of them. Their own lack of 
feeling, however, impacts their ability to perceive emotions in others. They have 
trouble detecting fear in the voice or facial expressions of others and “miss the 
emotional nuances of language” and “have trouble understanding metaphors—for 
example, they are more likely than others to judge as negative the phrase ‘Love 
is an antidote for the world’s ills.’”29 The rest of us understand that this phrase is 
hopeful because we feel it; psychopaths cannot understand because they cannot 
feel. On the other hand, feeling is not the antidote to suffering. Feeling another’s 
pain does not necessarily mean we wish to do something to alleviate that pain, 
or that we are interested in alleviating anything other than our own distress at 
the perception of pain. Batson points to research that “parents who are at high 
risk of abusing a child are the ones who more frequently report distress at seeing 
an infant cry” while parents at low risk do not report distress but rather “other-
oriented feelings—sympathy and compassion.”30 Similarly, empathy would be a 
very dangerous quality in an emergency room doctor; such doctors must be very 
good at turning off or disinhibiting empathetic responses to the sight of the pain 
of others so that they could take the actions necessary to alleviate the pain—even 
when it means causing more pain temporarily. 
So, what about Iago? He could not direct the psychological maelstrom that 
swirls around Othello if he was not particularly adept at knowing what Othello 
would see and feel from his perspective.31 Being able to read and respond to the 
emotional signals of others seems like a prosocial skill. A recent headline in The 
New York Times failed to shock the class-conscious by reporting that “The Rich 
Lack Empathy.” Those who reported being wealthy or more upper class were 
not as good at reading the expressions of emotion on the faces of strangers. The 
researchers suggest that, perhaps, having an expertise in the reading of social cues is 
less valuable to the wealthy, since they do not need to rely as much on the “kindness 
of strangers.”32 Those whose survival is more dependent on the help or allegiance 
of their neighbors are better able to navigate the social-emotional world around 
them. In an interesting follow-up experiment, when subjects were told to imagine 
themselves relative to the very rich, their ability to judge emotional expressions 
improved. Empathy is not, then, genetically coded to class or bank account balance, 
but rather it is dependent upon the story subjects tell themselves about their social 
standing and power. This suggests, though, that it is a skill that can be developed 
which seems counter to theories of it being automatic or neurological. We speak 
of empathy as if it were a virtue, an emotion, a reflex, and a power of imagination, 
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but it cannot be all of these things at the same time.
To feel for a character onstage is very different from feeling for another person 
in a laboratory; theatre and performance happens with and for a group. We do not 
feel in isolation in the theatre, we share the experience, perspective, and emotions 
with other people in the audience. Moreover, the audience watches the dynamics 
between characters onstage and there are always competing claims for our empathy. 
If empathy was simply (or even mostly) a case of embodied imitation leading to 
a shared affective state, at the end of Hamlet we would not be able to decipher 
between our feelings for Gertrude, Laertes, Hamlet, or Claudius.33 They all die, 
they all perform pain, but it is our sweet prince that receives the lion’s share of 
our emotional connection. Shakespeare can coax spectators to feel empathy for a 
misshapen murderous king like Richard III, but an fMRI experiment cannot handle 
this level of complexity.34 
Fritz Breithaupt combines empathy research from the neurosciences with 
narrative theory to posit that empathy involves side-taking in a three-person 
dynamic. He argues that empathy must be studied not within a two-person scene 
but in a more complicated social scene: “Most theories thus portray empathy as a 
particularly close observation in a two-person scene that also takes into account 
the intentions and emotions of the other person. . . . [I]t seems that this focus on 
observation within a two-person model may be too narrow for the most social 
animal.”35 His three-person model of empathy posits that because empathy is 
generally stronger when we perceive causality—this pain was caused by that person 
or event—it “results from taking sides in a three-person scene.”36 For Breithaupt, 
importantly, we feel empathy not in order to facilitate side-taking, but rather as a 
result of taking sides: “[A]fter the quick side-taking, empathy may come in and 
maintain the quick decision. Empathy would then be a secondary act, a consequence 
of taking sides. I feel with the other because I have decided for him.”37 Empathy 
presupposes side-taking. It would not be efficient to immediately feel (or internally 
mirror the emotions of) the four people dying onstage and then decide on whom 
to focus your empathy. That decision has been made and the emotional reaction 
follows.38
This formulation describes a cause-and-effect chain that suggests linearity, 
though, and I am persuaded by arguments that cognition is a dynamic system and that 
finding a “first” and then a “next” is less helpful than appreciating the complicated 
simultaneity of it.39 Understanding why Hamlet is moved by the Player and why 
we are moved by Hamlet is a far more complicated emotional event than watching 
a knife fall on a thumb or a person’s face contort in pain. Theatre scholars need 
emotion researchers to study the dynamics of emotion in the theatre, not just in the 
laboratory. Nonetheless, like Hamlet, scientists are trying to understand “What’s 
Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba, / That he should weep for her?” and what they 
are learning—about the immediacy of pain perception and also its mediation by 
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contextual information—can inform how scholars imagine the empathetic potential 
of theatre. Understanding the details of Hecuba and Priam’s story is important—
the Player cannot deliver his speech without knowing it—but it is not this story 
that moves Hamlet. It is, rather, the way in which the Player embodies the story. 
Similarly, the Player would not produce emotional effluvium simply hearing the 
story; he has to embody the story. It is in his telling it, not Hamlet’s telling of it in 
order to prompt him (“One speech in’t I chiefly lov’d, ‘twas Aeneas’ tale to Dido, 
and thereabout of it especially when he speaks of Priam’s slaughter”40) that brings 
about the emotional reaction that causes Hamlet’s emotional reaction. Shakespeare 
uses metatheatre here to point out not only the irrationality of caring but also the 
inevitability of caring. In Hamlet, Shakespeare stages watching, and the relationship 
between the two is where the comedy—and the pathos—is located. Shakespeare 
does not present the Player’s speech in order to move the audience of Hamlet; he 
presents Hamlet’s spectatorship of the speech in order to move the audience of 
Hamlet. In this complex system, we are moved by a spectator’s articulation of the 
power of witnessing.
Conclusion
The spectator watches Hamlet watching the Player talk about Hecuba. Who’s 
feeling what for whom? And what is the nature of this “feeling?” Damasio defines 
emotions as changes in body state and notes that spectators can perceive these 
emotions, but not the feelings (mediated by context, memory, story) that are 
conscious only to the individual experiencing them. For Barrett, emotions are not 
objects but an evaluation event that creates a story (subject, verb, object); and, for 
Griffiths and Scarantino, emotions are a product or element of the environment—
they are socially situated strategic probes. Emotional contagion research suggests 
that we are always, to some degree, emotionally porous and that we converge 
emotionally. Whatever the case may be, the incredibly exciting developments in the 
science of emotion suggest that our experience of the emotions of the performance 
is inseparable from an interpretation of what the event was. Central to Hamlet’s 
concern, and ours, is the biological changes evident during the Player’s performance. 
Furthermore, if emotion is indeed contagious, then theatrical representation can 
“catch” our consciousness—we are always aware of the emotional environment. 
And, if theories of situated emotion are correct, we are always contributing to this 
environment, meaning that the emotional performance of each individual audience 
is relevant to the analysis and interpretation of each night’s performance. This is 
why, perhaps, actors are right to talk about the “feeling in the house.” Hamlet’s 
experience calls on the sciences to ask the questions more central to our lived 
experience than the knife and the carrot: what happens when it is not a dyad in a lab?
For Jill Dolan, “painful empathy” led to a renewed hope for theatre:
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If our imaginations can lead us to profound, performative empathy, 
I believe ever more strongly that the space of performance must 
be harnessed to imagine love instead of hatred, to create hopeful 
fictions of meaningful lives instead of senseless deaths. I need to 
believe that theorizing and documenting, witnessing and creating 
performance will continue to grace our lives with meaning, 
generosity, understanding, and memory, however provisional 
and fleeting. I know that performance couldn’t stop the woman 
with the purse from jumping, but I hope it can memorialize and 
make sense of her actions.41
Based on research in cognitive science, Rhonda Blair finds a similar utopian place 
for theatre and performance in our lives:
I find it powerful that imagination, which fundamentally is about 
the organism having pictures of itself in different situations and 
contexts in order to know how to negotiate its environment 
as well as possible, happens not only consciously, but also 
extensively and richly below the level of consciousness, so that it 
might be possible to view what we are doing when we’re making 
theatre as helping the viewers’ bodies imagine themselves inside 
the stories we tell.42
Like Dolan, Blair, and Hamlet, I believe that what happens to us sitting in the 
theatre, watching a play is profound and has earth-shattering potential. I am still not 
sure how I want to define empathy in the theatre. I want it to include the visceral 
reaction spectators can sometimes feel in response to a performance—the mirroring 
across the fourth wall—but I do not have an answer for why this mirroring is both 
automatic and selective. I know that watching people put on a play operates as a 
cognitive perspective manipulator—it entails the taking of alternate perspectives—
and I want to believe that this encourages prosocial behavior. But what the science 
of emotion and empathy leads me to question is if it looks like what I think it looks 
like. In other words, if making me feel is not so very difficult (if you can do it 
with a video while I lie in an fMRI machine, you should be able to do it with live 
people, stories, music, and lighting), then perhaps what is powerful in the theatre 
is feeling agency and self. Breithaupt points out that empathy relies just as much 
on its lack as it does on its presence: “[E]mpathy, the understanding of others, only 
comes to pass because our emotional attention towards others is mostly jammed, 
blocked, and filtered. Without such a (partial) blockade we would live in a world 
of constant loss of perspective, in which we would involuntarily take over the 
perspectives of not only all the people with whom we came in contact, but also 
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those of animals, mythical creatures, and perhaps even objects.”43 So, perhaps, 
theatre helps us navigate the blockade. Shakespeare does not stage the Hecuba 
speech to show Hamlet something about Hecuba; Hamlet’s reaction is about 
Hamlet. While Hamlet’s verse unveils the kind of mirrored pain perception of an 
fMRI scan, Shakespeare shows us the character working through the pain to gain 
an understanding of his situation and finally grasping some degree of agency; he 
puts on a play. Hamlet is confused by the lack of connective tissue between himself, 
the Player, and Hecuba that would allow the kind of emotional seepage to occur, 
and so much of our acting and theatre theory aims to understand what it is that the 
Player must do inside to empathize with Hecuba in order to move Hamlet. But the 
cognitive sciences might lead us to another question: it is not the connecting of 
the three that theatre should aim at—that is always already there—but rather the 
separating of the three.  
So, back on my interdisciplinary beach, what I notice is that the scientific 
waters changing this particular beach are different than the scientific waters that 
washed over the beach of the Moscow Art Theatre or the Berliner Ensemble. Ideas of 
emotion—whether in the lab or in the theatre—impact the theatre we are interested 
in making and so, perhaps, we can see a different attitude toward emotions onstage 
in contemporary theatre. The sandcastles we can make here are exciting—there are 
garrets shaped from visual perception research, moats filled with Dynamic Systems 
Theory, and towers of conceptual blends. I want a space where the questioning 
itself can dissolve the categories of the object under investigation, where anything 
can be. I want to re-perform inquiry itself.
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